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Discrimination, Income Determination and Inequality  






This paper estimates the income effect of non productivity related discriminatory factors (like 
personal characteristics, social norms and policies), compared to productivity related returns 
on human capital. How important are personal characteristics, social norms and policy 
related discriminatory factors even in Shenzhen, one of China’s most outstanding examples of 
a successful city, and its transformation process? The design of the Shenzhen Household 
Survey 2005 that was employed here enables us to include a large set of discriminating 
factors in a Mincer Becker type of income model. Further, we are able to take a unique look 
at the migrant population in this urban centre. Our results show that the human capital 
approach holds. We also find strong evidence of a significant influence of social norms and 
policies, particularly relevant in a developing and transition economy, even in such an 
exceptional city. The most important discriminating factor appears to be the hukou 
registration system. The ongoing existence of these non productivity related discriminating 
factors can be regarded as indicator of an ongoing process of transition towards a fully 
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1 Introduction 
Shenzhen is one of the fastest growing urban agglomerations in mainland China. It can be 
regarded as highly developed and integrated into the world market. This is precisely why we 
chose Shenzhen as our area of study.  
As market forces lead to positive returns to education, in most developed economies human 
capital is the dominant determinant of income. For Shenzhen, on the one hand, productivity 
related market forces are expected to determine a large part of income. On the other hand, non 
productivity related discriminating factors such as personal characteristics, or policies, social 
norms, attitudes and traditions can also be expected to play an ongoing role for income 
determination. We define discriminatory factors broadly as every factor that has an impact on 
income that is not generated by real productivity.
1 In this paper we are particularly interested 
in these non productivity related forces. These factors are sometimes labelled (wage) income 
discrimination factors. Their impact on income and inequality of income can be regarded as a 
more general indicator of the socio-economic development during transition. As stated by 
Tanzi (1998), in developing and transition countries the impact of these factors on income is 
often higher than in economies mainly driven by market forces. To test for these factors the 
traditional Mincer-type model has been extended in various ways.  
 
Human capital related extensions include apart from age informal learning and experiences 
as well as modern sector specific human capital as income generating factors.  
In this respect time of residence positively correlates with income, as analysed by Fan (2001), 
Liu et al. (2004) and Wan (2006) especially for the Hong Kong metropolitan area which 
would stress a positive influence of the assimilation process. The migrants can accumulate 
city specific human capital or job skills, and adapt to local labour markets, thus improving job 
matching and enhancing their productivity the longer they reside in the city. This may 
ultimately justify a rise in income. Still, one cannot expect wage convergence towards native 
wage levels as a result of this process, i.e. discriminatory earning differentials may shrink but 
persist. 
In a somewhat related context, the migratory background may also influence income 
determination due to its influence on mobility and job changes. Yueh (2004) argues that 
labour mobility of migrants strongly exceeds the mobility of urban residents, with migrants 
usually earning less. In this context, lower wages for individuals who often change their 
occupation may reflect a general lack of human capital, or firm-specific human capital that is 
destroyed with a job change.  
 
Discriminating factors are the major focus of this paper. Therefore, we must identify the 
most relevant non productivity related factors of discrimination as suggested in the literature. 
This kind of discrimination is related to personal characteristics, social norms, attitudes and 
policies. With respect to the above questions the literature identifies a set of discriminatory 
variables which are briefly introduced in the following section. 
 
Gender and martial status are among the most studied personal characteristics. Ng (2004), 
Shu (2005) and Ng (2007) find that women with comparable education earn less than men as 
a consequence of gender discrimination rather than differences in productivity. These results 
are similar to findings by Knight and Song (2003) while Hughes and Maurer-Fazio (2002) 
state that the gender discrimination declines with  women’s rising education levels.  
                                                 
1 Obvious examples are gender, social status etc. . Human capital for example would not qualify because the 
impact on income is generated by a real productivity increase.    3
They also find that marital status also affects the gender wage gap as married women in 
China experience a more pronounced absolute wage gap compared to unmarried women.  
Furthermore Bishop et al. (2005) show that women generally experience smaller returns to 
marriage than men, especially for men with only small incomes. Here, they argue that this 
marriage income-gap is caused by different gender-related effects arising from marriage: 
Married men usually work harder and are more productive in their role as a family's provider, 
while married women may reduce their working efforts, perhaps to concentrate on raising a 
family. This argument is stressed by Li et al. (2006) who show that husbands contribute more 
to family earnings than wives. The argument that marriage enhances the productivity and 
commitment of men may also explain possible earning differentials between married and 
unmarried men. A different social status associated with marriage may be another 
explanation.  
 
For urban China, a China specific factor seems to be of particular importance. As pointed out 
by Xue and Gries (2007) the hukou
2 registration status appears to be one of the most 
important sources of discrimination. Migration from the rather poor rural areas
3 to the large 
cities driven by economic incentives leads to a huge presence of people with rural registration 
(hukou) in the urban areas [Chen and Coulson (2002), Du et al. (2005) or Lu and Song 
(2006)]. While the hukou registration system was designed to control and limit migration its 
success was limited and it was recently relaxed. Studies by Lu and Song (2006) Fan (2001) or 
Wan (2006) show the existence of significant income differences between the migrant 
population and inhabitants with an urban registration. These differentials cannot be explained 
by a higher endowment of productive skills by the urban registered population alone and are 
in part a consequence of discrimination. The hukou system also restricts social services such 
as education to local inhabitants [Liu (2005)]. The possibility to receive an urban hukou 
appears to correlate positively with educational attainment.  
 
Further, membership in the Communist Party still seems to influence income positively, as 
shown by studies from Knight and Song (2003) and Cao and Nee (2005). However, it should 
be noted that Party membership may not only be a discriminatory factor based on connections 
but rather also signal ambition or ability as stated by Gerber (2000) and Lam (2003).   
 
Employment in state-owned enterprises promises more job security and protection leading to 
better pay and social benefits. Employment in the private results in significantly higher 
employment risks. Workers are more exposed to market forces, driving down wages for low 
skills and driving up wages for higher skills. For the Chinese case, Knight and Song (2003) 
suggest that state-owned enterprises that usually employ urban residents pay better than 
private sector companies where most migrants work. Thus, the wage gap between urban 
residents and migrants may also partially be explained by the correlation of migration and 
mobility and labour market segmentation. In general, this labour market segmentation will 
affect all citizens in a Chinese urban area. 
Generally higher wages can be expected for employees in firms with high shares of foreign 
ownership. Firms with foreign ownership can be expected to have better access to 
international technologies and organisational skills and hence exhibit higher total factor 
productivity. If part of the higher productivity is passed to the workforce, foreign shares 
should positively affect wages. 
 
Also, social networking should be considered as a relevant determinant. Here, theory as e.g. 
assembled by Mouw (2003) suggests that higher social capital endowment, i.e. social 
                                                 
2 Hukou is the Chinese term for the Chinese urban registration status system. 
3 Also labelled the rural urban income gap by e.g. Sicular et al. (2007) or suggested by Lu and Song (2006).   4
networks of friends and acquaintances, positively affects wage determination through 
increased information and influence. In China, social networks (guanxi) are commonly 
believed to influence economic and political behaviour. For example, Bian and Ang (1997) 
find that guanxi networks influence the mobility of workers and their success in finding 
higher status jobs. As pointed out by Chen and Sun (2006), urban social networks influence 
an individual's access to better jobs, higher wages and the bureaucratic decision process. 
Thus, social capital may be closely connected to wage determination and its impact should be 
positive. Still, Chen and Sun (2006) find that the overall influence of urban social networks on 
income diminishes over time, particularly as the reform and growth process continues. 
Thereby, the influence of social capital on income may correlate more closely with lower paid 
jobs where market and productivity considerations do not matter as much. This brief review 
of related literature directly leads to the aims of this paper. 
 
The intention of this paper is to estimate the extent of existing income discrimination in 
Shenzhen, an especially dynamic case of a transition economy in China. How important are 
social norms and policy related discriminatory factors during the process of transformation, 
even if Shenzhen is one of the most outstanding examples for a successful transition? While 
in many other studies only subsets of the discussed factors were available, the design of the 
Shenzhen Household Survey 2005 allows us to look at a much larger set of these income 
determining factors. Further, the survey’s sample size enables us to explicitly look at the 
migrant population of this successful city. In addition, we can compare the impact of 
discriminatory factors between rural and urban registered residents. Therefore, the aim of this 
study is to quantify the extent of income discrimination and in this context take a closer look 
at the migrant population.  
 
To view the importance of human capital for income we start by decomposing income 
disparity using the Theil index in section 2. In the econometric analysis (section 3) we start 
with the traditional standard Mincer-type approach as a reference model. The results show 
that human capital is a significant income determining factor. In order to find the most 
relevant discriminatory determinants of income, various factors are added in the augmented 
model (model 2). Besides human capital, personal characteristics, social norms and attitudes, 
as well as specific government policies also appear to impact on the income pattern even in 
one of the most dynamic transforming cities of China. Further, an Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition analysis is applied to estimate the overall extent of discrimination between 
urban and rural hukou registration. Section 4 constitutes an overall economic discussion of the 
estimation results, and section 5 concludes.  
2 Human capital as an income generating factor in Shenzhen 
To what extent do market forces reward the additional productivity of education and 
qualification? If human capital generates additional income, differences in income can be at 
least partly explained by differences in human capital endowment. Therefore, as a first 
descriptive way to approach the defined problem we us the Theil index to decompose income 
differentials and focus on the contribution of formal qualification to income disparity. If 
income differentials can be mostly observed between groups with different formal education 
levels, we have some early evidence of the importance of human capital as an income 
generating factor. If the contribution of formal qualification to income disparity (measured by 
the Theil index) is small and disparity is observed basically within the qualification groups, 
other factors than human capital can be expected to play a major role for income 
determination and income disparity.  
 
The Theil index is a member of the Generalized Entropy (GE) family of indices [Cowell,   5
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where the parameter c captures the sensitivity of a specific GE index to different parts of the 
income distribution [Cowell, 1981, 2000].
4 Using the L'Hopitals rule, the GE index converts 






μ = , for  1 c = . In this case the Theil (T) index assigns approximately 
equal weight to all parts of the distribution. 
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We are particularly interested in the property of additive decomposability, meaning that an 
overall inequality measure can be additively decomposed into the subgroup inequality 
contributions. Decomposition of the Theil index
6 leads to  
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Total inequality is composed of the first term which describes the income share weighted 
inequality within each of the g subgroups, and the second term which captures the inequality 
between the different subgroups. The variable  g μ  is the mean income in subgroup g and sg is 
the share of total income of subgroup g. This decomposition allows us to take a more detailed 
look at the driving forces of income differentials and hence the role of human capital as an 
income generating factor.  
 
Formal qualification and income differentials are closely linked under market conditions. If 
formal qualifications can generate income, differences in formal qualifications will cause 
income differentials. Do we observe income differentials mostly between groups of various 
education attainment levels or within each of these groups? Is education the dominant 
determinant of income or are other discriminating factors and policies even more important. 
To answer this question we use the Shenzhen household survey 2005. The survey was 
conducted using random sampling taking into account the registration status of the residents. 
According to official data [Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2005] one third of inhabitants had a 
rural registration (hukou) and two thirds had an urban registration. This structure was 
reflected in the sample. The sample was drawn from three of the six districts of Shenzhen: 
Luohu, Nanshan and Baoan.  A total of 1056 households and 3256 individuals were surveyed. 
                                                 
4 For a given income distribution, a negative value of c gives more weight and sensitivity to gaps in the lower 
(income) tail of the distribution. For large and positive values of c , proportionally more weight is given to the 
upper (income) end of the distribution. It is thus adequate to pick a rather low or negative value for c if one is 
more interested in inequalities amongst the "poor", and a positive and high value for c if the interest is more 
focused on the "wealthy". The variable n represents the population size,  i y  the individual’s income and  y μ  the 
mean income of the population subject to measurement. 
5 A major advantage of the general entropy class of inequality measures and specifically the Theil indices is that 
they are the only inequality indices to satisfy the axioms [Bourguignon, 1979; Cowell 1980; Shorrocks 1980] of 
additive decomposability, symmetry (anonymity), population homogeneity (population replication), are income 
homogeneous of degree zero (scale invariance), continuous and differentiable in all individual incomes, 
additively decomposable and satisfy the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfer (strong principle of transfers). 
6 See e.g. Bourguignon 1979; Cowell 1980 or Shorrocks 1980.    6
For our analysis we restricted the sample to the working age population (between 16 and 65) 
and excluded any income which was reported to be below zero or above 1250000, which 
should be considered as too high to be correctly reported and is thereby removed as an outlier. 
For a full description of the survey see Xue and Gries (2007). We apply this data set by 
grouping according to various formal qualification and education achievements. We choose 
formal qualifications for grouping since in developed countries human capital is generally 
































Figure 1: Theil Index by education groups  
 
The results of our decomposition exercise are described in Figure 1 and straight forward. For 
Shenzhen we obtain a between group Theil-contribution Theil of 0.198 and a within group 
Theil of 0.486. Total value of the Theil index is 0.684. I.e., broadly speaking 30 percent of 
total income disparity comes from income differences between education groups. All the 
other differences (approximately 70 percent) in income are due to differences within each 
education group. From this result it becomes evident that a large part of income differentials 
cannot be explained by different endowments with human capital alone. Other discriminatory 
factors seem to have an important influence on income differentials.  
 
3 Empirical Model and Estimations  
After a first descriptive glance at the problem we turn to the econometric analysis. To be able 
to quantify the impact and importance of human capital and the various discriminatory 
factors we employ a regression analysis. We start with the simplest form of the regression 
approach and gradually augment our model to illustrate the importance of the various factors.  
   7
Model 1: As the first step in the regression analysis we employ the standard Mincer-Becker 
Equation
7 to estimate the returns to education and evaluate the impact of other discriminatory 
factors on personal income. We use the age of the individuals and its squared value
8 as 
proxies for the potential experience. It should be noted that the impact of these variables can 
be expected to be lower than in the original Mincer Equation as described by Harmon et al. 
(2005). Although econometric problems as discussed by Griliches (1977), Murphy and Welch 
(1990) or Card (2001) may occur when estimating returns to education, Lemieux (2006) 
argues that the Mincer equation generally remains valid and robust for the estimation of 
educational effects on earnings. As Card (1999) points out, the estimation of the causal effect 
of education on earnings using the traditional method faces only a small upward (ability) bias 
compared to identical twin studies. Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2002) concede that these 
findings are on average very similar to the ones presented in their worldwide compilation and 
state that the estimation method makes little difference to the returns to education. To correct 
for the heteroskedasticity in the dataset due to an increase in the variance in earnings with an 
increase in the age of the individuals, we employ White-corrected standard errors.  
 
We use the model described in Table 1 as a reference point for the quality of the augmented 
Mincer model introduced thereafter:  
 
lnworkingtime: logarithm of number of hours worked in the year
low: completed primary education 
sec: completed secondary education (Junior High, High School, Technical College)
high: completed tertiary education (Junior College, University, Postgraduate)
Age: Age in years (potential experience)
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Table 1: Standard Mincer-type model as reference model 
 
On the left side of our estimation equation is the logarithm of the yearly income. On the right 
side we start with the constant followed by the standard Mincerian variables, namely the age 
of the individual and its squared value, yearly working hours and dummy variables for 
completed school levels. The dummy variables low, sec and high represent the corresponding 
completed education levels and are equivalent to an average number of 6.0, 10.5 and 16.6 
school years. The results for this reference model are reported in Table 3.  
 
                                                 
7 This method was first described by Mincer (1958, 1962, 1974), Becker (1962) and Becker and Chiswick (1966) 
and Chiswick (2006). 
8The additional use of its squared value in traditional Mincer type estimations of the earnings 
function captures the mentioned decreasing returns over lifetime. 
 
   8
Model 2: The second model is an extended version of Model 1. To be able to quantify the 
effect of other discriminatory factors like personal characteristics, or social norms and 
attitudes we add further variables Xi, [i=1…n] to the basic Mincer-type regression. The choice 
of these variables is based on the set of discriminatory factors identified above. The full 
model is now described in table 2.  
 
lnworkingtime: logarithm of number of hours worked in the year
low: dummy for completed primary education 
sec : dummy for completed Junior High or High School or Technical College
high : dummy for completed Junior College or University or Postgraduate studies
Age: Age in years (potential experience)
Agesq: Age squared (parabolic shape of lifetime income)
infedu: dummy for reported informal education, i.e. on the job training
stay: duration of residence in Shenzhen in years
job_changes: total number of job changes
male: dummy for gender
married: dummy for marital status
social norms attitudes and policies
rural: dummy for rural regestration (hukou)
sez: dummy for living within the Special Economic Zone
commi: dummy for communist party membership
friendjob: dummy for job provision by a friend/relative
stateshare: dummy for employed by company that is  if fully or partly state owned


























++ + + + ∑ ε
 
Table 2: Definition of the augmented Mincer-type model, model 2. 
 
Model 3: After it became evident that rural hukou has by far the most important and highly 
significant impact of all discriminatory factors on the regression results, and after testing for 
the equivalence of the coefficients for both groups (of hukou) it became evident that the data 
contain different sets of information for the different groups and should not be pooled. 
Therefore, we ran a separate regression for both population subgroups for the complete set of 
variables taken from model 2. Model 3a defines the regression for people with an urban 
hukou and model 3b is the model for rural registered people.  
 
Regression results: Running the regression for all four models we received the results 
reported in Table 3. To compare the explanatory quality of our augmented Mincer model 
(Model 2 und Model 3a and 3b) with a basic version without any explanatory variables 
accounting for social norms and attitudes and policy measures (Model 1) we also calculated 
the Akaike information criterion for both models.    9
 
 
Table 3: Regression results 
 
The differences between the basic model (model 1) and the full model (model 2) are 
significant and the goodness of fit of the full model is better than of the simple model. This 
implies a clear and significant impact of the discriminatory factors on personal earnings. We 
also tested the blockwise significance of all the variables in the vector X. They proved to be 
significant at the 1% level. The
2 R of 54% shows a relatively high explanatory power for the 
full model. The 
2 R of around 33% for the separate regressions (model 3a and 3b) is still 
comparatively good. It is clear that the coefficients for the urban and rural subgroups differ 
widely. Especially their returns to education appear to be significantly different. As this 
section reports just the results, a more extensive economic discussion of all these effects is 
given in the subsequent section (section 5).  
 
Using the results of table 3 we calculate the income impact factors for the different formal 
qualifications and years of schooling (see table 4)
9. The income impact factor per completed 
formal qualification is the total income effect of completing a particular formal qualification. 
Finishing higher education instead of no education generates a jump in income. I.e., an urban 
university graduate has (other things equal) on average an income that is 2.17 times as high as 
the income of person with no education. The income impact factor per year of schooling 
captures the return of one more year of schooling within the respective formal qualification 
program. E.g. the reward for an additional year of schooling within high education leads on 
average to an increase in income by the factor 1.13 for an urban resident. Thus the first value 
indicates a comparable return per year during each type of education, while the second value 
gives the total reward for the completed qualification (compared to no education). In table 4 
we report the differing returns for urban and rural registered people according to the results 
                                                 
9 The method is using continuous time like Mazumdar (1981). For details see the appendix.    10



























rural  25.6% (1.006)
2) (1.03)





2) 56.6% 1.13 2.17
1) For shares in this group people with low and no education have been pooled so that the shares sum up to 100%
low secondary high
2) Values in parentheses are only reported for completeness. The values are statistically insignificant. Hence, for 
further calculation these values are  taken as zero.
income impact factor per  income impact factor per  income impact factor per 
 
 
Table 4: Educational attainment by hukou, and income impact factors of education attainment 
 
To obtain an overview of the distribution of education in the rural and urban registered 
population subgroups we also report the percentage of the working age population with a 
completed specific formal qualification in each subgroup. For this population share only, 
those with no or little education have been added to the low category so that the values of all 
shares sum up to 100.  
 
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition: In addition to the regressions we employ the Oaxaca-
Blinder [Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973)] decomposition method to examine whether 
differences in the endowments of the two groups or a difference in the returns for these 
endowments are mainly responsible for the differences in average income. In this context the 
label “endowment” stands for the characteristics and attributes of the group, while the label 
“return” stands for the different rewards for these characteristics and attributes. Therefore, the 
observable income differences among the two groups may be due to differences in group 
endowments (differences in characteristics and attributes, e.g. higher share of university 
graduates etc.), or due to differences in returns (rewards for the characteristics and attributes, 
e.g. for university graduation). The income differences which can not be explained by 
differing endowments are differences in returns. These (in terms of differing endowments) 
unexplainable differences are an estimate of discrimination. This discrimination is often 
labelled “return effect”. The differences due to differing attributes are mostly called 
“endowment effect”.   
 
We apply the decomposition method to the full regression model (model 2) and use the 
subscript r for people with rural registration and u for people with urban registration. While 
, ur YY  is the mean of the income in each group,  , ur X X  represents the vector of the means of 
the explanatory variables which we refer to as attributes.  ˆˆ , ur β β  denote  the  estimated 
coefficients for the respective variable of model 2.  
 
Hence, the general equation [Oaxaca and Ransom 1994] for the decomposition is   
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10 We do not report the values for primary and secondary education for urban hukou since the coefficients proved 
to be clearly insignificant.   11
 
 
As the methodology requires a choice of the reference group for the non-discriminatory 
normal wage structure by assigning a value for the weighting matrix Ω, there have been 
various discussions about the best definition of this weighting matrix. For a full discussion see 
e.g. Oaxaca and Ransom 1994. We decided to follow Oaxaca and report the values for both 
reference groups to limit any reference group bias, assuming that the true value lies between 
both boundaries.  For  0 Ω =  (taking the group u as reference category) we obtain: 
()() ˆˆ ˆ
ur u r r u u r YY X X X β ββ −= − + − . This term can be transformed into an expression 
suitable for economic interpretation, 
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In this equation the difference in mean income  ur YY − between rural r and urban u is explained 
by the difference in endowments (first term) and the difference in returns for those 
endowments (second term). Table 5 shows the result of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.   
 
(rural as reference group):   I 53.4% 46.5%
(urban as reference group): 0 47% 52.9%






Table 5: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results 
 
For  0 Ω=  (urban as reference group) the return component accounts for 52.9% of the income 
differential. This means that on the average and all other things being equal, the higher 
income of people with an urban registration is to 52.9% due to higher returns to the different 
characteristics and attributes and to 47% due to higher endowments themselves. This would 
imply a degree of income discrimination of 52.9% of the total average income difference 
between both groups.  
 
To avoid any reference group bias we conducted the same decomposition with the rural hukou 
subgroup as reference group. The respective values are 53.4% endowments and 56.5% returns 
if we change the reference group to those with rural registration ( I Ω = ).  
  
4 Education vs. Personal Characteristics, Social Norms and Attitudes 
Education: As expected from human capital theory, formal as well as informal education 
both significantly affect personal income. This result can be clearly drawn from the 
regressions in table 3. A major part of income can be explained by formal qualifications. 
While secondary and higher education have a significant and large influence on average 
earnings, low education seems to be insignificant. More generally, the positive impact of 
education increases with the education level as observed e.g. by Xue and Gries (2007), or 
Zhang et al. (2005) for urban China. The returns to formal education from the basic model 
(model 1) come close to the estimates of Zhang et al. (2005) even if they divide the 
educational levels into more groups and their latest observed year is 2001. However, if we add 
the gender dummy to model 1 [like in Zhang et al. (2005)] our coefficient for higher 
education appears significantly lower. In our sample only the return to higher education is 
affected because the relative share of males with this level of education rises significantly 
after secondary education. So the gender dummy reduces the overall return significantly at   12
this level of formal achievement.  
Informal education (indicated by age and infedu) also contributes positively and significantly. 
This can be explained by relating informal education to real individual productivity as 
observed by Xiao (2002). “Frequent job changes” (job_changes) was discussed as indicator 
for low and easy substitutable human capital. Therefore, the negative and significant sign of 
table 3 supports this idea. Furthermore, the “time of residence in Shenzhen” (stay) has a 
positive impact on earnings. Even if the coefficient is small this result would support the 
thesis of assimilation and accumulation of location or modern sector specific human capital. 
However, compared to the impact of formal qualifications, informal education affects income 
much less.  
 
Discriminatory Factors: Generally speaking, inserting the carefully chosen discriminatory 
factors leading to the full specification in model 2 added a lot of explanatory power to the 
income analysis. The estimation results of the extended model (table 3) indicate that besides 
human capital, many other discriminatory factors remain relevant for income determination in 
Shenzhen. All non productivity related personal characteristics and social norms and policies 
indicating variables except the stateshare dummy prove to be significant and show the 
expected sign.  
 
Two of the most frequent personal characteristics considered are gender and marital status. 
Gender discrimination (male) appears to be present and highly important, since the male 
dummy underlines that being male exerts great influence on income. It is unclear if the 
positive impact of marriage (married) is mostly due to traditional views or higher motivation 
and need as discussed above. 
 
Receiving help by relatives or friends when searching for a job (friendjob) is negative. This is 
particularly interesting because social networking seems to be an important part of the 
allocation mechanism in many transition economies in Eastern Europe. Within the context of 
strong family boundaries and easy implicit or explicit compensation payments within a 
family, it would have been reasonable to expect that relatives or friends would be preferably 
appointed when filling highly paid vacancies. However our results suggest the opposite. In 
this sample people with the highest income found their job through the newspaper. This result 
may indicate a rather efficient job market matching process in which unofficial job provision 
practices seem of low importance at least for higher income jobs. However, our result could 
indicate that job provision by friends is needed for workers with particularly low skills or 
personal handicaps entering the labour market. Hence, once these people are employed, they 
realize a reduction in income.  
 
Membership in the Communist Party (commi) still seems to be of some importance in 
determining income. However, from the data we can also see that the share of people in the 
Communist Party in each education group drastically increases the higher the education 
group. Nearly half of those with postgraduate status are members of the party whilst only 
compromising 10% of the whole sample.  
 
People who reside in the districts that became a special economic zone in 1980 have a 
significantly higher income than people who do not. This effect is clearly indicated by the 
positive and significant coefficient of the sez dummy variable. This result implies that the 
conditions that came along with SEZs in Shenzhen provided a significant positive 
environment for income growth of the residents. Partly related to SEZs is the ownership of the 
firm where a person is employed. While employment by government owned firms 
(stateshare), as reported before, does not significantly add extra income, employment by   13
firms with foreign shares matters. Being an employee in a company that is partially or fully 
owned by a foreign investor (foreignshare) significantly increases personal income.  
 
From the estimation results in table 3 it is evident that the most important discriminating 
factor in Shenzhen is the hukou system. Having a rural hukou status considerably decreases 
income opportunities. Models 3a and 3b reveal the differences, and the decomposition 
analysis also supports the idea of substantial discrimination of workers with a rural 
registration. Form the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition we obtain that only 47%-53.4% of 
income differences are due to differing endowments while the remaining unexplained amount 
of income difference is an estimate of discrimination.  
 
The results of the separate regressions in models 3a and 3b confirm that a rural hukou not 
only has an absolute negative effect on income but also changes the relative impact of the 
income determining factors. Many of the factors determining the income of urban registered 
people do not affect that of people with rural hukou. Most notably, being member of the 
Communist Party
11, living in the SEZ or job provision by a friend does not have any impact 
on rural registered people. In general they earn much higher relative returns to secondary and 
higher education as well as informal education than inhabitants with an urban hukou. For 
urban registered residents even secondary education is insignificant in the separate regression. 
This result may be partly due to the distribution of education within the subgroups. Far fewer 
people with a rural hukou have attained higher education. Also, secondary education qualifies 
as a distinctive positive attribute while for most urban registered people it can be assumed to 
be normal. 
 
Low education doest not appear to generate extra income in both groups. The large share of 
people with low education and presumably a lack of differentiated jobs at this level of formal 
qualification does not lead to sufficiently distinguished wages between low and no education. 
Primary education alone does not offer any positive return to education (even for people with 
a rural hukou where nearly 8% of the sample have not completed primary education) so the 
incentive to stay in the school system and complete more than just primary education seems 
evident. However, education beyond primary levels seems to be especially important for 
people with rural hukou. While far fewer people with a rural hukou attended higher education 
the return to higher education is extremely high upon migration to the city. Therefore, 
promoting higher education for rural registered people and linking them to the modern sector 
would be an effective measure to reduce income inequalities.  
Summary and Conclusion 
Shenzhen is one of the most outstanding examples for successful transition in China. It can be 
regarded as highly developed and integrated into the world market. For a better understanding 
of transformation processes (in China) we introduce this case study for Shenzhen to analyze 
the income determining and discriminating factors. For transition economies, on the one hand 
productivity related market forces are expected to determine a large part of income. On the 
other hand, non productivity related discriminating factors such as personal characteristics, 
policies, social norms and traditions can still be important for income determination. The 
impact of these discriminating factors on income is sometimes regarded as a more general 
indicator for socio-economic development during transition. 
 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that the rural hukou Party members make up only one third of urban hukou communist 
Party members.    14
In this paper we are particularly interested in these non productivity related forces, that are 
sometimes labelled income discrimination factors. The intention of this paper is to estimate 
the extent of the existing income discrimination in Shenzhen. In particular, social norms and 
policy related discriminatory factors during the Chinese process of transformation are 
analysed. While in many other studies only subsets of the most important discriminating 
factors were available, the design of the Shenzhen Household Survey 2005 allows us to look at 
a much larger set of these income determining factors. Further, the survey allows us to take an 
explicit look at the migrant population of this successful city, and compare the impact of the 
different discriminatory factors with the urban registered residents. 
 
  The results of the Theil Index decomposition already suggests, that most of the income 
differentials cannot be explained by different endowments with human capital alone. Other 
discriminatory factors seem to have an important influence on income differentials.  
Our regression analysis emphasizes that besides human capital, non productivity related 
personal characteristics, social norms and attitudes, as well as specific government policies 
seem important for the income pattern in Shenzhen. Gender and marital status as well as 
policy measures, such as the formation of special economic zones or employment in a 
company, that is fully or partial foreign owned, all have an important impact on personal 
income.  
 
Furthermore, from the estimation results it is evident that the most important discriminating 
factor in Shenzhen is the hukou system. Having a rural hukou status considerably decreases 
income opportunities. A rural hukou not only has an absolute negative effect on income, but 
also changes the relative impact of the other income determining factors. Many of the factors 
determining the income of urban registered people do not affect the income of people with 
rural hukou. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition analysis further supports the idea of 
substantial discrimination of people with a rural registration.  
 
It seems apparent that social discrimination and policy measures and especially the effect of 
the hukou system are still very important for determining individual income. These results can 
be assumed to indicate that, even if we study the case of an outstanding successful urban 
centre, Shenzhen has not fully completed the transition process towards an economy that is 
dominated by productivity and pure market forces.  
 




Calculating the effects of education  
 
1) The following method was used to calculate the effects of education on income: The 
general marginal percentage effect of a formal qualification  i  1,2,3..  compared to the base 
group  0  can be directly taken from the estimation coefficients  i,   e.g.  
lnYi − lnY0  i  





2) The marginal percentage effect of achieving the next higher formal qualification  Y1 → Y2   
is also taken from the estimation coefficients  i  e.g. 
lnY3 − lnY2  lnY3 − lnY0 − lnY2  lnY0
lnY3 − lnY0 − lnY2 − lnY0  3 − 2
lnY3 − lnY2  3 − 2  
In continuous time we obtain the income impact factor for achieving the next qualification 






3) The return effect of another year of schooling within a certain formal education program i 
leads to the income impact per year of schooling  Yit → Yit  1  and can be calculated by 
using the estimation coefficients  i,j  and relate the total effect to the average years of 
schooling for the particular formal program i . If  ti . is total duration of schooling for 
qualification i  than in continuous modelling we obtain for e.g. i=3,2:   
 
t3 − t2 : additional years of schooling for qualification3
3 − 2
t3 − t2
: percent impact of the average year
 
and finally the income impact factor of an additional year of schooling in program i=3 






   16
References 
 
Becker, G.S. (1962), Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, Journal of 
Political Economy, 70, 9-49. 
Becker, G.S., Chiswick, B.R. (1966), The Economics of Education. Education and the 
Distribution of Income, American Economic Review, 56(2), 358-369. 
Bishop, J.A., Luo, F., Wang, F. (2005), Economic transition, gender bias, and the distribution 
of earnings in China, Economics of Transition, 13(2), 239-259. 
Bian, Y., Ang, S. (1997), Guanxi Networks and Job Mobility in China and Singapore, Social 
Forces, 75(3), 981-1005. 
Blinder, A. (1973), Wage discrimination: Reduced form and structural estimates, Journal of 
Human Resources, 8(4), 436-455. 
Bourguignon, F. (1979), Decomposable Income and Inequality Measures, Econometrica, 
47(4), 901-920. 
Cao, Y., Nee, V. (2005), Remaking Inequality: Institutional Change and Income Stratification 
in Urban China, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 10(4), 463-485. 
Card, D. (1999), The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings, Center of Labor Economics, 
University of California, Berkeley, Working Paper No. 2. 
Card, D. (2001), Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Progress on Some Persistent 
Econometric Problems, Econometrica, 69(5), 1127-1160. 
Chen, A., Coulson, N.E. (2002), Determinants of Urban Migration: Evidence from Chinese 
Cities, Urban Studies, 39(12), 2189-2197. 
Chen, X., Sun, J. (2006), Sociological Perspectives on Urban China: From Familiar 
Territories to Complex Terrains, China Information, 20(3), 519-551. 
Chiswick, B.R. (2006), Jacob Mincer, Experience and the Distribution of Earnings, in: 
Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (Ed.), Jacob Mincer: A Pioneer of Labor Economics, Springer 
Publishing, 109-126. 
Cowell, F.A. (1980), On the Structure of Additive Inequality Measures, Review of Economic 
Studies, 47, 521-531. 
Cowell, F.A. (1981), Generalized Entropy and the Measurement of Distributional Change, 
European Economic Review, 13, 147-159. 
Cowell, F.A. (1995), Measuring Inequality, 2
nd ed, Prentice Hall. 
Cowell, F.A. (2000), Measurement of Inequality, in: Handbook of Income Distribution, Vol. 
1, Elsevier Science. 
Cowell, F.A., Kuga, K. (1981), Additivity and the Entropy Concept: An Axiomatic Approach 
to Inequality Measurement, Journal of Economic Theory, 25, 131-143. 
Du, Y., Park, A., Wang, S. (2005), Migration and rural poverty in China, Journal of 
Comparative Economics, 33, 688-709. 
Fan, C. (2001), Migration and labor-market returns in urban China: results from a recent 
survey in Guangzhou, Environment and Planning, 33, 479-508. 
Gerber, T. P. (2000), Membership Benefits or Selection Effects? Why Former Communist 
Party Members Do Better in Post-Soviet Russia, Social Science Research, 29(1), 25–50. 
Griliches, Z. (1977), Estimating the Returns to Schooling: Some Econometric Problems, 
Econometrica, 45(1), 1-22. 
Harmon, C., Oosterbeek, H., Walker, I. (2003), The Returns to Education: Microeconomics, 
Journal of Economic Surveys, 17(2), 115-155. 
Hughes, J., Maurer-Fazio, M. (2002), Effects of Marriage, Education and Occupation on the 
Female/Male Wage Gap in China, Pacific Economic Review, 7(1), 137-156. 
Jian, T., Sachs, J.D., Warner, A.M. (1996), Trends in Regional Inequality in China, China 
Economic Review, 7(1), 1-21.   17
Knight, J., Song, L. (2003), Increasing Urban Wage Inequality in China. Extent, elements and 
evaluation, Economics of Transition, 11(4), 597-619. 
Lam, K. C. (2003), Earnings Advantage of Party Members in Urban China, Working Paper, 
Business Research Centre, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong. 
Lemieux, T. (2006), The 'Mincer Equation' thirty years after 'Schooling, Experience and 
Earnings', in: Grossbard-Shechtman, S. (Ed.), Jacob Mincer: A Pioneer of Modern Labour 
Economics, Springer Publishing, 127-145. 
Li, H., Zhang, J., Sin, L.T., Zhao, Y. (2006), Relative earnings of husbands and wives in 
urban China, China Economic Review, 17, 412-431. 
Liu, P.-W., Zhang, J., Chong, S.-C. (2004), Occupational segregation and wage differentials 
between natives and immigrants: evidence from Hong Kong, Journal of Development 
Economics, 73, 395-413. 
Liu, Z. (2005), Institution and inequality: the hukou system in China, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 33, 133-157. 
Lu, Z., Song, S. (2006), Rural-urban migration and wage determination: The case of Tianjin, 
China, China Economic Review, 17, 337-345. 
Mazumdar, J. (1981), The Urban Labor Market and Income Distribution: A Study of 
Malaysia, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Meng, X. (2004), Economic restructuring and income inequality in urban China, Review of 
Income and Wealth, Series 50, 3, 357-379. 
Mincer, J. (1958), Investment in Human Capital and Personal Income Distribution, Journal of 
Political Economy, 66, 281-302. 
Mincer, J. (1962), On-the-Job Training: Costs, Returns and Some Implications, Journal of 
Political Economy, 70, 50-79. 
Mincer, J. (1974), Schooling, Experience and Earnings, New York: Columbia University 
Press for the National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Mouw, T. (2003), Social Capital and Finding a Job: Do Contacts Matter? American 
Sociological Review, 68, 868-898. 
Murphy, K.M., Welch, F. (1990), Empirical Age-Earnings Profiles, Journal of Labor 
Economics, 8(2), 202-229. 
Ng, Y.C. (2004), Economic development, human capital, and gender earnings differentials in 
China, Economics of Education Review, 23(6), 587-603. 
Ng, Y. C. (2007), Gender Earnings Differentials And Regional Economic Development in 
Urban China 1988-97, Review of Income and Wealth, Series 53, 1, 148-166. 
Oaxaca, R. (1973), Male-female wage differentials in urban labour markets, International 
Economic Review, 9(3), 693-709. 
Oaxaca, R., Ransom, R. (1994), On discrimination and the decomposition of wage 
differentials, Journal of Econometrics, 61, 5-21.  
Psacharoppoulos, G.; Patrinos, A. (2002), Returns to Investment in Education: a Further 
Update, The World Bank Working Paper 2881. 
Shorrocks, A.F. (1980), The Class of Additively Decomposable Inequality Measures, 
Econometrica, 48(3), 613-626. 
Shu, X. (2005), Market Transition and Gender Segregation in Urban China, Social Science 
Quarterly, 86, 1299-1323. 
Sicular, T., Ximing, Y., Gustafsson, B., Shi, L. (2007), The Urban--Rural Income Gap And 
Inequality In China, Review of Income and Wealth, 53(1), 93-126. 
Tanzi, V. (1998), Fundamental Determinants of Inequality and the Role of Government, IMF 
Working Paper 98/178. 
Theil, H. (1967), Economics and Information Theory, North Holland Publishing. 
Wan, A.T.K. (2006), On discrimination and the status of immigrants in the Hong Kong labour 
market, Economic Bulletins, 10(6), 1-17.   18
Wan, A.T.K. (2006), On discrimination and the status of immigrants in the Hong Kong labour 
market, Economic Bulletins, 10(6), 1-17. 
Xiao, Y. (2002), Determinants of salary growth in Shenzhen, China: an analysis of formal 
education, on-the-job training, and adult education with a three-level model, Economics of 
Education Review, 21, 557-577. 
Xue, J., Gries, T. (2007), Human Capital Accumulation and Income Distribution in Urban 
China : The Case of Shenzhen, The Economic Science, 2007 (12), 101-115.  
Yang, D.T. (2005), Determinants of schooling returns during transition: evidence from 
Chinese cities, Journal of Comparative Economics, 33, 244-264. 
Yueh, L.Y. (2004), Wage Reforms in China During the 1990s, Asian Economic Journal, 
18(2), 149-164. 
Zhang, J., Zhao, Y, Park, A., Song, X. (2005), Economic returns to schooling in urban China, 
1988 to 2001, Journal of Comparative Economics, 33, 790-752. 
 
 
 Recent discussion papers 
 
2008-09 Stefan  Gravemeyer, 
Thomas Gries, 
Jinjun Xue 
Discrimination, Income Determination and Inequality – 
The case of Shenzhen 
 
 
2008-08 Thomas  Gries, 
Manfred Kraft, 
Daniel Meierrieks 
Linkages between Financial Deepening, Trade Open-
ness and Economic Development: Causality Evidence 
from Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
2008-07 Tim  Krieger, 
Sven Stöwhase 
Diskretionäre rentenpolitische Maßnahmen und die 
Entwicklung des Rentenwerts in Deutschland von 
2003-2008 
 
2008-06 Tim  Krieger, 
Stefan Traub 
Back to Bismarck? Shifting Preferences for Intragene-
rational Redistribution in OECD Pension Systems 
 
2008-05 Tim  Krieger, 
Daniel Meierrieks 
 
What causes terrorism? 
2008-04  Thomas Lange  Local public funding of higher education when 
students and skilled workers are mobile 
 
2008-03  Natasha Bilkic,  
Thomas Gries, 
Margarethe Pilichowski 
When should I leave school? - Optimal timing of leaving 
school under uncertainty and irreversibility 
 
 





Statutory retirement age and lifelong learning 
2008-01 Tim  Krieger, 
Thomas Lange 
 
Education policy and tax competition with imperfect 
student and labor mobility 
2007-05 Wolfgang  Eggert, 
Tim Krieger, 
Volker Meier 
Education, unemployment and migration 
    
2007-04 Tim  Krieger, 
Steffen Minter 
Immigration amnesties in the southern EU member 
states - a challenge for the entire EU? 
[forthcoming in: Romanian Journal of European Stud-
ies] 
    
2007-03 Axel  Dreher, 
Tim Krieger 
Diesel price convergence and mineral oil taxation in 
Europe 
[forthcoming in: Applied Economics] 
    
2007-02 Michael  Gorski, 
Tim Krieger, 
Thomas Lange 
Pensions, education and life expectancy 
    
2007-01 Wolfgang  Eggert, 
Max von Ehrlich, 
Robert Fenge, 
Günther König 
Konvergenz- und Wachstumseffekte der europäischen 
Regionalpolitik in Deutschland 
[published in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 8 
(2007), 130-146.] 
    
    
    
    
 